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When does original academic scholarship about the law and capital
markets influence financial regulation? We suggest that capital market
regulators often are driven by scholarly findings in the fields of finance and
law to launch important new regulatory initiatives. However, we argue that
private political motivations rather than the public interest drive policymakers'
decisions about when to heed-and when to ignore-relevant social science
evidence. We support our thesis with six examples of situations in which
scholarship was, or arguably should have been, the catalyst that launched a
major regulatory initiative. In three of these examples policymakers decided to
regulate, and in three other contexts policymakers chose to ignore completely
equally powerful social scientific evidence.
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Introduction
In this Essay, we discuss the puzzling disparity between contexts in which
important social science scholarship in economics and finance influences
regulation and public policy, and contexts in which it does not. We argue that
capital market regulators often are driven by scholarly findings in the fields of
finance, law, and economics to launch important new regulatory initiatives.
Indeed, without the new insights provided by such scholarship, it is likely that
none of the major regulatory initiatives that have altered the landscape of U.S.
capital markets over the last decade would have occurred. But cutting-edge
scholarship does not always provoke a regulatory response. We argue here that
equally important scholarly findings often have different fates. Some are
ignored by the regulatory and political powers that be, while others are
embraced.
What determines whether scholarship elicits attention or fades into
oblivion? We argue that private political motivations rather than the public
interest drive policymakers' decisions about when to heed-and when to
ignore-important and relevant social science evidence. We demonstrate this
thesis using three contexts in which social science evidence in finance was used
to launch major regulatory initiatives and three other contexts in which social
science evidence that was at least as strong was ignored completely.
Investigating these contexts provides a basis for evaluating both the role of
independent research and the role of the regulatory and political process in
effectuating change.
Within the category of attention-getting research, we discuss three
academic studies. The first of these research blockbusters was William Christie
and Paul Schultz's article in the Journal of Finance, entitled Why Do NASDAQ
Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?' Christie and Schultz's empirical
I William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth
Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994).
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analysis of price fixing on the NASDAQ market led to massive antitrust and
securities enforcement efforts, a private class action lawsuit that generated a
settlement of over $1 billion, and an investigation by the U.S. Department of
Justice into price fixing that concluded with fines exceeding $1 billion on major
U.S. investment banks, as well as dramatic new regulations and market
practices concerning not only the way orders are handled in the securities
markets, but also how securities prices are quoted.
A second piece of scholarship in law and finance that launched a thousand
(or more) lawyers into action was work done by Eric Zitzewitz on late trading
in U.S. mutual funds.2 Zitzewitz demonstrated that the prices at which mutual
funds bought and sold their own shares from their investors often were
inaccurate, providing crafty institutional investors such as hedge funds the
ability to transfer wealth to themselves from unsophisticated mutual fund
investors. 3 Eliot Spitzer, then an ambitious, entrepreneurial state attorney
general, launched an investigation that ultimately involved virtually every
major mutual fund complex, and resulted in regulatory settlements of
approximately $3 billion, a figure that does not include recoveries by private
plaintiffs in civil litigation.4
Finally, a third example that illustrates the power of research to change
markets is research in 2004 by Erik Lie on the backdating of stock options by
public companies. 5 Building on earlier work by David Yermack, Lie
demonstrated that stock prices systematically tended to fall just prior to the date
on which the options were supposedly granted, but they rose almost
immediately after the grants. 6 Equally intriguing, this pattern held even when
the changes in the stock price were due to movements in the market and not to
information related to the option-issuing company. His conclusion that "at least
some of the awards are timed retroactively" 7 resulted in a plethora of Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice (DOJ), and state
enforcement actions; class action lawsuits; and, as of now, at least one criminal
conviction.
8
We will then turn to situations in which equally insightful social science
evidence is ignored. The first of the three case studies examined involves a
fascinating 2004 article in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
called Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S.
Senate. Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd, and Brigitte J.
2 Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds, 19 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 245 (2003).
3 Id.
4 See Todd Houge & Jay Wellman, Fallout from the Mutual Fund Trading Scandal, 62 J. BUS.
ETHICS 129 (2005).
5 Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SC. 802 (2005).
6 dd.
7 Id. at 812.
8 Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe Improper Backdating of Options, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2005, at Al; see also Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Backdating Probe Widens as 2 Quit Silicon
Valley Firm, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2006, at Al.
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Ziobrowski showed that U.S. senators are able to use their inside information
about forthcoming government action to obtain significant positive abnormal
returns on their equity investments. 9 In response to the "shocking" news of
public officials using their official positions for personal gain, Louise Slaughter
(D-NY), the chair of the House Rules Committee, and Brian Baird (D-WA) co-
sponsored the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act.' 0 The proposed
legislation died in congressional committee.
A second area of research neglect is the government's criminal
prosecution of Arthur Andersen following Enron's collapse. The government
justified its decision to put Arthur Andersen out of business on the grounds that
Andersen was significantly more corrupt and susceptible to capture by its
clients than its rival auditing firms, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately unanimously overturned Andersen's conviction.1
1
Yet a study of 1000 large, public firms from 1997-2001 by Ted Eisenberg and
Jonathan Macey published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies found no
evidence that Andersen's performance as an auditor was any different from the
performance of its peer group of auditing firms. 12 Andersen clients also did not
encounter accounting difficulties or experience accounting fraud more often
than the clients of other large accounting firms. 
13
A third example of policymakers' ability to ignore scientific evidence
when it is convenient for them to do so is reflected in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002.14 Roberta Romano demonstrated in her article Sarbanes-Oxley and the
9 Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S.
Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661 (2004).
10 See, e.g., Press Release, Brian Baird, U.S. Representative (Wash.), Reps. Baird and
Slaughter Introduce Legislation To Prohibit Insider Trading on Capitol Hill (May 16, 2007), available at
http://www.house.gov/list/press/wa03_baird/stockact.html. The Act was first proposed as H.R. 5015 in
the 109th Congress. In the 110th Congress, the Act stalled in committee as H.R. 2341.
II Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (vacating Arthur Andersen's
conviction for obstruction ofjustice). The Court held that the instructions to the jury were fatally flawed
because these instructions permitted Andersen to be convicted regardless of whether Andersen was
aware that it had broken the law. The opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, emphasized that
"the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing.
Indeed, it is striking how little culpability the instructions required." Id. at 706.
12 In January 2002, the international accounting firm Deloitte & Touche published an audit
quality peer review of Andersen that reached empirical results consistent with those reported by
Eisenberg and Macey. This peer review is regarded as highly comprehensive. It covered 240 Andersen
engagements in 30 offices. The review concluded that "Andersen's system of accounting and audit
quality provided reasonable assurance of compliance with professional standards." See Paul K. Chaney
& Kirk L. Philipich, Shredded Reputation: The Cost ofAudit Failure, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1221 (2002). A
study has shown that Arthur Andersen clients reported bad news in a less timely fashion than other
accounting firms, but this study focuses only on clients in Andersen's Houston office, which, unlike the
rest of Andersen, likely was captured by at least some of its audit clients. Gopal V. Krishnan, Did
Houston Clients of Arthur Andersen Recognize Publicly Available Bad News in a Timely Fashion?, 22
CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 165 (2005).
13 Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathaii R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical
Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263
(2004).
14 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
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Making of Quack Corporate Governance15 that Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX),
arguably the most important federal statute in the area of corporate law and
corporate governance, was passed without any attention to the available social-
scientific evidence in finance and economics. This evidence suggested that
many of the strictures required by SOX did not actually enhance corporate
value or promote investor welfare.
Drawing on these examples, can we predict when scholarship will
influence policy and when it will not? In this Essay, we put the preceding
discussion in perspective in two ways. First, we argue that scholarship is a tool
used by entrepreneurial policymakers to justify the launch of salient, high-
profile, politically important enforcement initiatives. Press coverage is an
important but nonessential part of this story. Oftentimes it appears that the
regulatory response to a piece of scholarship in law and finance occurs in
response to coverage of the scholarship in the popular press. But sometimes, as
in the case of insider trading in the Senate, there is no regulatory response to
important scholarship, despite widespread press coverage.
The finding that regulatory initiatives sometimes, but not always, follow
the press coverage of scholarly work supports the second argument in this
Essay, which posits that regulators are opportunistic in deciding when to use,
and when to ignore, the results generated by social science research in law and
finance. When regulators and policymakers find it politically expedient to act,
as they did in the cases of Arthur Andersen and Enron, scholarship occasionally
gets in their way. When this happens, politicians react either by not making the
obvious inquiry, or by ignoring the immediately available and highly relevant
evidence. On the other hand, when regulators and policymakers find it
politically expedient to do nothing, as they have in the case of insider trading
by members of Congress, politicians react in the same way: by ignoring the
immediately available and highly relevant evidence. We conclude this Essay by
offering some observations on the role of scholars and politicians in effecting
change in policy.
I. Scholarship Sometimes Influences Policy
Sometimes scholars successfully influence public policy and sometimes
they do not. The truth and power of the work do not seem to be the key
determinants of influence. Rather, political expediency appears to be the
determinative factor. What follows in this Part of the Essay is the description of
a clear pattern. Academics in finance examine data and find an interesting
result that can only be explained by controversial (and perhaps illegal) conduct
by corporations, investment banks, or other market participants. The research is
both scholarly and newsworthy and impresses not only academics, but also
journalists in major publications like the Wall Street Journal and the New York
15 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
Yale Journal on Regulation
Times. From there, the findings get on the agenda of politically ambitious
regulators and policymakers, and some-as was most notably the case with
Eliot Spitzer, former Attorney General of New York State-use this research to
launch major legal and regulatory change.
This progression from working paper to article to the popular press to the
regulatory agenda of state and federal bureaucrats reveals a pattern that we
consider to be of great importance: scholars really do influence and affect the
regulatory agenda in profound ways. In fact, the three illustrations of such
effect that appear below represent the major regulatory initiatives of the last
two decades.
A. The Not-So-Odd Story of Odd-Eighth Quotes on NASDAQ
Few, if any, articles have ever generated anything remotely resembling the
press coverage, the regulatory reaction, or the legal fees produced by the 1994
Christie and Schultz article Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-
Eighth Quotes?. 16
This article examined trading in the NASDAQ stock market, which, along
with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), is one of the two principal equity
markets in the United States. Like other U.S. equity markets, the NASDAQ
stock market competes for listings and order flow by offering an attractive
trading venue to purchasers and sellers of equity securities. In short, what
Christie and Schultz found was not just price-fixing, but probably the most
subtle and successful price fixing scheme since Adam Smith began to worry
about the problem in the eighteenth century. 17 To understand how this clever
scheme worked, it is necessary to understand how pricing and trading occurred
in the NASDAQ stock market.
Equity markets function so that purchasers of a security can buy that
security by paying the lowest offering price available in the market, while
sellers of a security can sell that security by agreeing to accept the highest bid
price available. The available "bid-asked spread" or "spread" in a particular
market is simply the difference between the highest available bid price for a
security in a market and the lowest available offer price for that security at a
particular moment in time.
18
All else equal, the tighter the bid-asked spread for a particular security, the
higher the quality of the market for that security. Unlike the NYSE, which at
16 Christie & Schultz, supra note 1.
17 In Adam Smith's immortal words, "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even
for merriment and diversion; but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Random House 1937).
18 Of course, one bidder may offer the highest bid while an entirely different bidder may
display the lowest offer price for a particular security at a particular time. At any given time, the
organizers of the market combine the best bid price and the best offer price from all participating traders
in order to obtain the best spread.
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that time employed a specialist system to ensure high-quality markets, in the
NASDAQ multiple dealers competed for order flow by quoting competing bid
and offer prices. This so-called "multiple dealer market" is thought by many to
generate tight, competitive bid-asked spreads as competing dealer firms (for
example, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch) attempt to attract "order flow"
(customers) by quoting the best markets. 1 9
At the time Christie and Schultz wrote their article, prices on most equity
markets were quoted in fractions (specifically eighths) rather than decimals.
Thus, for example, a very good spread would be $100 bid-$100 1/8 offered. An
increase in the spread, say to $99 7/8 bid-$100 1/2 offered, would reflect a
deterioration in the quality of the market, as buyers would be buying at a higher
price on the offered side, and sellers would be selling at a lower price on the
bid side.
On the other hand, all else equal, as the bid-asked spread goes up, the
profits of the dealers making the markets in the security increase
concomitantly. When the bid-asked spread is $100 bid-$100 1/8 offered, a
dealer buying on the bid side (at $100) and selling on the offer side (at $100
1/8), will make $12.50 on each 100 shares traded.20 An increase in the spread,
say to $100 bid-$100 1/2 offered, would increase a dealer's profit from $12.50
to $50.00.21 Thus, while retail customers prefer narrow spreads, dealer firms
that make markets in a particular stock prefer wide spreads, since such wide
spreads can translate into higher profits for dealers.
The striking finding of Christie and Schultz was that dealers making
markets in stocks traded on the NASDAQ avoided what the authors described
22
as "odd-eighth" price quotes. In other words, market makers avoided price
quotes such as $100 1/8, $100 3/8, and $100 5/8, that is, quotes in which the
numerator of the fraction was an odd number such as 1, 3, or 5; price quotes
were never just $0.125 (1/8), they were at least $0.25 (1/4). Specifically,
Christie and Schultz found that during the time period they examined, odd-
eighth quotes were virtually non-existent for 71 of a sample of 100 actively
traded NASDAQ securities, including Apple Computer and Lotus
Development. After carefully considering and rejecting alternative
explanations, Christie and Schultz tentatively suggested that their results
implied that NASDAQ dealers were colluding to maintain inappropriately
wide, anti-competitive spreads.
19 Eugene Kandel & Leslie M. Marx, NASDAQ Market Structure and Spread Patterns, 45 J.
FIN. ECON. 61 (1997).
20 With a spread of $ 100 bid-$100 1/8 offered, shares will be bought for $10,000 ($ 100 per
share x 100 shares) and sold for $10,012.50 ($100.125 per share x 100 shares).
21 With a spread of S100 bid-S100 1/2 offered, shares will be bought for $10,000 ($100 per
share x 100 shares) and sold for $10,050.00 ($100.50 per share x 100 shares).
22 Larry Harris, in his 1991 article Stock Price Clustering and Discreteness, first documented
that stock prices tend to cluster on particular price points. Lawrence Harris, Stock Price Clustering and
Discreteness, 4 REV. FIN. STuD. 389 (1991). Christie and Schultz built on this work to demonstrate the
non-random pattern in price quotes.
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Even before the Christie and Schultz results were published, the press
began to report on Christie and Schultz's empirical findings that there might be
collusion on the NASDAQ. The reaction of market participants was immediate
and rather incriminating. On May 27, dealers in Amgen, Cisco Systems, and
Microsoft sharply increased their use of odd-eighth quotes. 23 Market quality
improved as bid-asked spreads fell by about fifty percent.2 4 On May 29, the
same tightening of bid-asked spreads was observed for Apple Computer.25
Shortly thereafter, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
began an investigation of NASDAQ market makers, and the SEC began an
investigation into the trading practices of firms and traders on the NASDAQ.26
These investigations confirmed Christie and Schultz's conjecture that market
participants on the NASDAQ were colluding to increase spreads by eschewing
odd-eighth quotes. In addition, the investigations provided a wealth of insight
into the way that the price-fixing scheme was enforced. The existence of threats
to ostracize or to stop dealing with traders who quoted stock prices in odd
eighths was established. Market participants testified that market makers who
ignored the prohibition on odd-eighth quotes would receive threatening phone
calls. 27 Samira Guennif and Valerie Revest reported that the mere threat of
being ostracized within the trading community was sufficient to discourage
market makers from violating the social norm against odd-eight quotes. As one
equities trader testified, he was "dissuaded from narrowing spreads 'because,
many years ago, as a junior trader, I wanted to be accepted."- 28 On some
occasions, traders resorted to intimidating telephone conversations that were
captured on audio tapes:
Trader 1: Who trades CMCAF in your place without yelling it out?
Trader 2: ... Sammy
Trader 1: He's trading it in eighths and he's embarrassing your firm.
Trader 2: I understand.
Trader 1: You know, I would tell him to straighten up his [expletive deleted] act,
stop being a moron.
As a result of these various investigations, the U.S. Department of Justice
obtained a $1 billion antitrust settlement for public investors against twenty-
23 William Christie, Jeffrey H. Harris & Paul H. Schultz, Why Did NASDAQ Market Makers
Stop Avoiding Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1841, 1841 (1994).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the
NASD and the NASDAQ Market, 52 S.E.C. 882 (1996); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
DIVISION, UNITED STATES V. ALEX BROWN AND SONS, INC., COMPETITIVE IMPACT STATEMENT (1996),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0700/0739.pdf.
27 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 26, at 18, 25, 30.
28 Samira Guennif & Valfrie Revest, Social Structure and Reputation: The NASDAQ Case
Study, 3 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 417, 423 (2005); see Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 26, at 18.
29 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 26, at 25-26.
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four of the nation's largest securities firms. There also was a $1.027 billion
settlement in the private civil antitrust suit. The SEC's investigation led to a
host of new rules about how broker-dealer firms must handle customers'
orders. In addition, the elimination (or at least the diminution) of price fixing
on the NASDAQ led to much more competitive markets. Transaction costs fell
dramatically for both large and small traders. Further, automated electronic
trading systems that competed with NASDAQ for order flow experienced a
sharp increase in quote size.
31
B. Late Trading and Market Timing
In 2003, Eric Zitzewitz, a young assistant professor at Stanford Business
School, examined trading in U.S. mutual funds.32 His research led to one of the
most massive market manipulation investigations of all time. A mutual fund-
or investment company, as a mutual fund is sometimes known-is simply a
corporation that uses the capital raised from investors to construct a portfolio of
investments. The returns to investors in the mutual fund are a straightforward
function of the income and capital gains (or losses) on the mutual fund's
investment portfolio.
A strong attraction to investors of certain mutual funds known as "open-
end" mutual funds is that investors can sell their mutual fund shares back to the
mutual funds. The availability of this option makes the mutual fund investment
more liquid for the investor. The value of the mutual fund is determined every
day by calculating the value of each of the fund's investments; the value of
each investor's shares, referred to as the "Net Asset Value" (or NAV), is then
the mutual fund value divided by the number of outstanding shares in the
mutual fund. Each share owned by an investor can be sold back to the mutual
fund for the NAV. Likewise, new or additional investments in the mutual fund
are made by buying shares in the mutual fund at the appropriate NAV.
A problem with this system of allowing customers to transact directly
with mutual funds for the purchase and sale of their investments in those funds
is the risk that NAVs will be calculated inaccurately. When NAVs are
calculated inaccurately, wealth may be transferred among mutual fund
customers. Generally speaking, a mutual fund will calculate the NAV at the end
of each trading day based on the price at which each of the mutual fund's
holdings last traded. However, where a mutual fund portfolio contains
investments such as stock in thinly capitalized companies whose shares trade
very infrequently, the price used to calculate the NAV on any particular day
might be stale and inaccurate.
30 In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 184 F.R.D. 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
31 Michael J. Barclay et al., Effects of Market Reform on the Trading Costs and Depths of
NASDAQ Stocks, 54 J. FIN. 1, 20 (1999).
32 Eric Zitzewitz, How Widespread Was Late Trading in Mutual Funds?, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
284 (2006).
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Suppose, for example, that the last trade in a particular stock in a mutual
fund's portfolio occurred at 11:00 a.m. on a particular day, but that important
news relevant to the firm's share price came out at 3:00 p.m. Under these
circumstances the NAV may be inaccurate because it reflects stale prices.
Similarly, if the fund contains shares in companies traded on Asian or
European stock markets, which, of course, operate in different time zones,
pricing might occur at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time, despite the fact that the most
recent trades in those stocks may have occurred as much as fourteen hours
earlier. If the fund calculates its NAV using such stale prices, the fund price can
be seriously inaccurate. Sophisticated traders who know about the use of stale
prices in a mutual fund's NAV calculation can transfer wealth from
unsophisticated mutual fund investors to themselves.
As Zitzewitz points out:
Investors can take advantage of mutual funds that calculate their NAVs using
stale closing prices by trading based on recent market movements. For example,
if the U.S. market has risen since the close of overseas equity markets, investors
can expect that overseas markets will open higher the following morning.
Investors can buy a fund with a stale-price NAV for less than its current value,
and they can likewise sell a fund for more than its current value on a day that the
U.S. market has fallen.
33
Testing this theory empirically, Zitzewitz showed that market timers who
bought mutual funds with large international holdings on days when U.S. stock
markets went up and sold mutual funds with large international holdings on
days when U.S. stock markets went down made very large abnormal returns.
These returns not only beat general market indices, but also far exceeded the
returns that an investor could receive from investing directly in the funds
themselves. Zitzewitz argued that these abnormal returns harmed other fund
shareholders, calculating, for example, that in 2001, long-term shareholders lost
out to market timers by an average 1.1% of return in broad international funds
and even more (2.3%) in regionally focused funds.34
Two things distinguish the mutual fund market timing controversy from
the NASDAQ odd-eighth quote price-fixing controversy. First, there was a
considerable lag between the academic evidence that showed the problems with
mutual fund pricing and the regulatory response. Early studies of the problem
of pricing inefficiencies in mutual funds emerged in 1998. Zitzewitz's more
pointed study came out in 2003.
Second, not only was there substantial evidence that the problem existed,
unlike the NASDAQ odd-eighth quote controversy, the SEC clearly was aware
of the problems with mutual fund trading. 35 The SEC implored the mutual fund
33 Zitzewitz, supra note 2, at 246.
34 Id. at 246-47.
35 Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 59 (2005) [hereinafter Mutual Fund
Trading Abuses] (testimony of Eric Zitzewitz, Professor, Stanford Graduate School of Business) ("[T]he
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industry to eliminate the possibilities of abuse by using what is known as "fair
value pricing," which simply involves imputing the asset prices of securities
that have not traded for a certain period of time using their relationships to the
price of related but more actively traded securities. 36 Interestingly, it appears
that when the mutual fund industry resisted the SEC's efforts to reform the
industry's pricing practices, "the SEC essentially backed down."
37
Meanwhile, on September 3, 2003, the State of New York acted when
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed a civil lawsuit against the major hedge
fund Canary Capital Partners LLC, alleging that Canary had engaged in "late
trading" in collusion with Bank of America's Nations Funds. 38 Bank of
America was charged with permitting Canary to purchase mutual fund shares
after the markets had closed at the closing price for that day.39 Canary agreed to
pay $40 million to settle the civil charges, without admitting or denying guilt.
40
Bank of America compensated the shareholders in its own mutual funds for
losses incurred in the funds' transactions with Canary by paying a total of $375
million which was distributed to the mutual funds and to the shareholders in
those funds that were said to have been harmed by the bank's late trading.
41
Only after Spitzer acted did the SEC begin an enforcement initiative. In
the following months, investigations were launched into the trading practices of
dozens of mutual fund companies, including Strong, Putnam, Invesco, and
Prudential Securities. The heads of Strong and Putnam, two of the largest
mutual fund complexes in the U.S., were forced to resign. The Chairman and
CEO of Strong were alleged to have engaged in illegal market-timing trading in
his own company's mutual funds. Ultimately, virtually every major mutual
fund complex was investigated by the SEC, the Attorney General of New York,
or both. As a result of these enforcement efforts, late trading ground to a halt.
For example, Zitzewitz found that, "as of the fourth quarter of 2004, the
average international fund was removing about 70% of the price staleness in its
NAVs via fair pricing" as compared with the removal of only about seven
42percent of stale pricing in 2002. Interestingly, however, these enforcement
SEC was aware of inefficiencies in the pricing of mutual fund shares that created arbitrage
opportunities .... ").
36 Models to predict mutual fund fair-values, such as ITG's Fair-Value Model, were available
to mutual funds at this time, but their adoption was greatly accelerated following the late trading
scandal.
37 Mutual Fund Trading Abuses, supra note 35, at 60.
38 Ari Weinberg, Eliot Spitzer Finds His Canary, FORBES.COM, Sept. 3, 2003,
http://www.forbes.com/2003/09/03/cx-aw0903spitzer.html.
39 Id.
40 Gregory Zuckerman, Top Hedge-Fund Trader Admits to 'Late' Trades, WALL ST. J., Oct.
3, 2003, at CI.
41 Press Release, SEC, SEC Reaches Agreement in Principle to Settle Charges Against Bank
of America for Market Timing and Late Trading (Mar. 15, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-
33.htm.
42 Eric W. Zitzewitz, Ass't Prof. of Econ., Stanford Grad. Sch. of Bus., Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, on "Mutual Fund Trading Abuses" 3 n.7, available at
http://www.investorscoalition.com/judzitzewitzjune705.pdf.
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efforts probably were not consistent with applicable SEC regulations, which
clearly permit the activities being prosecuted by the regulators.43
C. Options Backdating
In 1997, New York University finance professor David Yermack
published a paper on the relationship between stock prices and option grants.44
Yermack was interested in the ability of corporate managers to influence their
own compensation. Employing a sample of 620 stock option awards made
between 1992 and 1994 to chief executive officers of the largest U.S.
corporations, Yermack found that the timing of stock option awards coincided
uncannily with favorable movements in company stock prices. Specifically,
CEOs received stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news
that led to upturns in company share prices.
This research raised the question of why share prices went up so often
immediately after options were granted to insiders. Perhaps insiders are simply
extremely prescient and astute in predicting the future movement of share
prices. Or perhaps something more nefarious, like insider trading or market
manipulation, was going on. Yermack and others wondered whether corporate
insiders used their inside knowledge that their companies were about to
experience some positive event and simply arranged to be granted stock options
in advance of the public announcement of the good news. Similarly, one might
also conjecture that announcements of positive events and results might
actually be delayed pending the award of stock options to insiders.
Research in 2004 by Erik Lie was the first to raise the possibility that
public companies might be backdating stock option grant dates to enrich their
senior executives. 45 Options backdating is the practice of granting an employee
a stock option that permits the grantee to purchase shares at a price on a date
prior to the date that the company actually granted the option. For example,
suppose that a company's share price was $25 per share on March 1, 2008, but
has risen to $35 per share on April 30. Clearly, an option to purchase stock in
the company at the lower March 1 price is more valuable than an option to
purchase stock in the same company at the higher April 30 price. Such
backdating raises potential legal and regulatory problems.
Just as there is nothing illegal about granting an executive an option that
permits the purchase of stock at a price below the current market price for that
stock, there is nothing illegal per se about options backdating. But the practice
does raise important issues regarding the proper tax treatment and appropriate
43 See Affidavit of Jonathan R. Macey, paras. 12-27, People v. Sihpol, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1729 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 2005) (on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
44 David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News
Announcements, 50 J. FIN. 449 (1997).
45 Lie, supra note 5.
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financial reporting for options with these characteristics. For example, the tax
and financial reporting of an option that is granted at below-market prices-orS46
whose exercise price is backdated to a date on which the shares' prices are
lower than they are on the grant date-is much different than the tax and
financial reporting of a stock option grant where the exercise price is equal to
or greater than the market price on the day when the options are granted.47
Shortly after Lie's research was published, he met with Charles Forelle and
James Bandler, Wall Street Journal reporters who won the Pulitzer Prize for
public service for reporting on the nature and implications of Lie's research.
This reporting, in turn, led to SEC and Department of Justice inquiries and
investigations into hundreds of companies that may have awarded backdated
stock options to executives, including Apple Computer, Comverse Technology,
48United Health Systems, and Brocade Communications. The options scandal
instigated by Lie's research has led to announcements of earnings restatements,
delistings, resignations, expanding federal probes, and even the criminal
conviction of a highly respected insider, Gregory Reyes, the CEO of Brocade.49
Lie extended the earlier work of Yermack by examining options grants by
companies that granted options to executives in consecutive years, but not on
the same day every year. Lie discovered a pattern: stock prices systematically
tended to fall just prior to the date on which the options were said to have been
granted, but they rose almost immediately after the grant.5 ° In other words, if
one thinks of a stock price chart, options were granted at a dip in the market
price that preceded a price increase. Of equal interest to Lie was the fact that
the options grants to lucky executives did not always precede good news about
the particular company for which an executive worked. Instead, often options
appear to have been granted just prior to increases in stock prices for the entire
stock market that had nothing to do with any events in the company granting
the options. In other words, the executives receiving stock options grants not
46 The exercise price of an option is simply the price at which the securities that underlie the
option may be purchased or sold. The exercise price of an option sometimes is referred to as the "strike"
price. For example, if someone is given the option to purchase shares in a company for $42.00, then
$42.00 is the exercise price for those shares. There is nothing wrong with granting somebody the option
to purchase shares at $42.00 at a time when the actual market price for those shares is higher than
$42.00, so long as the options grant is properly disclosed and the appropriate tax payments are made by
both the company granting the options and the recipient of the options.
47 In 1992, the SEC imposed a rule requiring companies to provide detailed information about
the stock options granted to executives. However, the reporting was not sufficiently detailed to allow
investigators to determine if a particular option had been backdated. Executive Compensation
Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, [1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,056 (Oct. 16, 1992).
48 Jodell R. Nowicki, Stock Option Backdating: The Scandal, the Misconception & the Legal
Consequences, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 251 (2008), available at
http://www.stjohns.edu/media/316e667ca74ea64a2f87a79057dfl a7c7f.pdf.
49 See Eric Dash & Matt Richtel, Backdating Conviction, a Big First, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2008, at CI. One of this Essay's authors was an expert witness on corporate governance issues for the
defense in this case.
50 Lie, supra note 5, at 802.
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only appear to have been very prescient about news at their own firms; they
also appeared to have been very prescient about the stock market in general.
These results led Lie to the conclusion that "at least some of the awards are
timed retroactively."
51
After the initial study, Lie and Randall A. Heron published another paper
that examined a change made in 2002 in the way that option grants are
reported.52 This change required companies to report option grants within forty-
eight hours. Lie and Heron found that when companies reported options the
same day they were granted, there was no pattern of share prices quickly
rising. But the pattern continued when companies delayed reporting option
grants as permitted by the statute.
54
Lie actually sent a copy of his article to the SEC in early 2004 and later
received an acknowledgement stating it was interesting. 55 Then, in March 2004,
building on Lie's work, the Wall Street Journal printed a story on the front
page that used its own statistical analysis to identify several companies with
highly suspicious grant practices. 56 Among other findings, the Wall Street
Journal reported several option grants made to Jeffrey Rich, the former chief
executive officer of Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. All of these grants
ostensibly were made immediately prior to sharp spikes in Affiliated's share
price, and the odds against this happening by chance were 300 billion to one,
twice as bad as the 146 billion to one odds against winning the Powerball
lottery with a $1 ticket.57
II. Scholarship Sometimes Doesn't Influence Policy
The above discussion raises two possibilities: (1) that press coverage of
scholarly findings about possible wrongdoing in the financial markets is what
leads to regulatory intervention in response to the scholarship; or (2) that
regulators and other policymakers follow up on scholarly findings when it is
politically expedient for them to do so, and ignore scholarly findings when it is
politically convenient for them to do that. The case studies in this Part of the
Essay attempt to resolve this controversy. The first hypothesis, that the press
serves as the catalyst for regulatory intervention, can be discarded because we
show that regulators will not intervene, even where there is press coverage of a
51 Id.
52 Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around
Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271 (2005).
53 Id. at 271.
54 Id.
55 Steve Stecklow, Options Study Becomes Required Reading, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2006, at
BI.
56 Deborah Solomon, SEC Probes Options Grants Made as Company News Boosts Stock,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2004, at Al.
57 James Bandler & Charles Forelle, ACS Officers Quit After Internal Options Probe, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A3.
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particular scholarly finding with clear regulatory implications, when it is not
expedient for them to do so. Thus, it appears that the second hypothesis, that
regulation serves the political interests of the regulators, is the more plausible
explanation for the regulatory responses to the scholarly work discussed in this
Essay.
A. Insider Trading by Politicos
Members of Congress have access to material information that will affect
share prices. Imagine, for example, that a senator (call him "Bill Frist") pushes
for an asbestos settlement fund and announces that asbestos legislation is one of
his top priorities. Imagine further that the prices of companies such as USG
Corp. and W.R. Grace, which are involved in asbestos litigation and subject to
potential asbestos liability, dramatically increase in value just before Frist's
announcement, which is viewed as very good news for these companies.
Should a member of Congress, or a member of his or her staff, be allowed to
trade or to tip off other traders prior to the public announcement on the basis of
their prior knowledge of this announcement? In fact, members of Senator
Frist's staff were accused of tipping off Wall Street traders prior to Frist's
announcement, thereby causing an unexpected jump in the share prices of USG
and W.R. Grace. An article in BusinessWeek stated "the news got to key Wall
Street players a day early via a little-known pipeline: a small group of firms
specializing in 'political intelligence' that mine the capital for information and
translate Washington wonk-speak into trading tips."58 Frist's office denied that
any staff members sold the information.
59
In this section of the Essay, we will argue that trading on the basis of
material, non-public information by members of Congress not only appears to
occur rather often but also has been carefully documented in both empirical
studies and by the press. We further will argue that this trading is probably
illegal under current law. Even if it weren't illegal, however, we argue such
behavior could, and should, be made illegal. Finally, we argue that the only
plausible explanation for why there have been no regulatory efforts to attack
the practice of congressional insider trading, and no successful efforts to enact
laws to deal with such abuses, is that congressional influence has been used to
block such efforts.
In 2004, Ziobrowski and his coauthors examined 6000 disclosure filings
submitted by U.S. senators, testing to see how their investments performed in
the five-year period 1993-1998. Surprisingly, the Ziobrowski study found that
senators perform exceedingly well as investors. The results, published in the
58 Washington Whispers to Wall Street: Low-Profile Firms Enjoy a Lucrative Business Selling
"Political Intelligence," Bus. WK., Dec. 26, 2005, at 42, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05-52/b396506 .htm.
59 Id.
60 Ziobrowski et al., supra note 9, at 675.
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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, showed conclusively that
members of Congress can and do outperform the market. 61 Ziobrowski and his
coauthors constructed a portfolio that replicated the transactions in which
senators had engaged during the period 1993-1998, finding that the senators
outperformed the market in general by an astonishing ninety-seven basis points
per month on a trade-weighted basis or about 12% per year over the five-year
period of the study.62 In other words, U.S. senators do a much better job
growing their own personal portfolios than they do growing the U.S. economy,
the growth of which ranged from 3-4.5% during this period. Thus, senators'
personal portfolios outperformed the country's own economic progress by as
much as 400%. U.S. senators also outperformed ordinary folks, of course. A
2000 study of 66,465 U.S. households from 1991 to 1996 showed that the
average household's portfolio underperformed the market by 1.44% a year, on
average.63 One group of corporate insiders (senior executives) has been found
to outperform by about 5%.64
The only possible explanation for this result is that elected officials are
using their superior access to information that will affect markets to make
trading profits. Interestingly, Ziobrowski also found that there was no
significant difference between the trading profits garnered by Democratic
senators and Republican senators. Both groups significantly outperformed the
market. The Ziobrowski study also showed that senators were particularly
skilled at buying stocks at their lowest prices during a particular trading period
and selling them at their highest prices during a particular trading period.65
Unsurprisingly, the fact that the personal stock portfolios of U.S. senators
outperformed the market by 12% a year over a five-year period was
newsworthy. Sure enough, on February 24, 2004, this news was reported in the
financial press.66 In the second paragraph, quoting Ziobrowski, the Financial
Times reported that the results of his study "clearly support the notion that
members of the Senate trade with a substantial informational advantage over
ordinary investors."
67
1. Is Congressional Trading Insider Trading?
The current law of insider trading, as relevant to the issue of whether
trading by congressional insiders is illegal, seems quite clear. Under existing
law, anyone who trades for personal gain on the basis of information entrusted
61 Id. at 675-76.
62 Id. at 675.
63 See Deborah Brewster, Senators' Stocks Beat the Market by 12 Percent, FIN. TIMES
(FT.com), Feb. 24, 2004.
64 Id.
65 Ziobrowski et al., supra note 9, at 675.




to him by others in breach of fiduciary duty is in violation of the anti-fraud
provision of the law. As developed in a series of cases from United States v.
Carpenter to United States v. 0 'Hagan69 there can be no doubt that trading on
information that is misappropriated from one's employer or other entity to
whom one owes a fiduciary duty is illegal under SEC Rule lOb-5.7 ° In other
words, taking confidential business information and using it for one's own
benefit is actionable.
The fact that the employer never planned to, and could not have traded on
the information itself, is irrelevant. For example, in both Carpenter and
O'Hagan, trading was done by employees of companies (a newspaper and a
large law firm) that did not have any intention to trade, and could not have
traded on the information that formed the basis for the employees' trading.
Thus, the fact that senators are trading on information that the U.S. government
would not be using itself to make trading profits is irrelevant.
The Supreme Court in O 'Hagan specifically held that a person who trades
in securities for personal profit on the basis of misappropriated confidential
information in breach of a fiduciary duty is guilty of violating Section 10(b) of
the Securities Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 1Ob-5. In her majority opinion, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg observed that "[t]he 'misappropriation theory' holds that
a person commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities transaction, and
thereby violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he misappropriates
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty
owed to the source of information."
71
The most important limit on the scope of the legal prohibition on insider
trading is that such trading is only illegal when it is done in breach of what the
courts describe as a fiduciary duty, that is, a pre-existing duty of trust and
confidence. Prior to its ruling in O'Hagan, the Supreme Court twice had
emphasized that there is no such thing as a generalized fiduciary duty between
68 United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
69 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 UMS. 642 (1997).
70 Section 10(b) makes it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934). The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 pursuant
to its authority under Section 10(b) as one of the most widely used legal rules against securities fraud
and insider trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b (2008). Adopted in 1942, Rule lOb-5 provides that:
[lI]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, b) to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made,... or c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
71 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 643.
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a trader and her counterparties. 72 Similarly, the Court had stressed that traders
do not owe any sort of fiduciary duty to the market as a whole.
73
The first case rejecting the existence of open-ended fiduciary duties to
market participants was a 1980 criminal case involving a financial printer
named Vincent Chiarella who, in the course of his employment, identified the
concealed names of several tender offer targets from documents he was
preparing for printing.74 Mr. Chiarella's employer, Pandick Press, had been
retained by bidding firms to print the documents required to be filed in
connection with their tender offers. Mr. Chiarella subsequently bought stock in
target firms' shares, netting profits totaling $30,000, on the basis of material,
non-public information gleaned during the course of his employment.
Upon discovering Chiarella's trading, the SEC referred the matter to the
Department of Justice, asking the DOJ to bring criminal charges against
Chiarella for violating SEC Rule lOb-5. Overturning Chiarella's conviction at
trial, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the theory underpinning the
government's case was that Chiarella had breached a fiduciary duty to the
marketplace.75 The Supreme Court reasoned that since Chiarella did not owe
any kind of duty of trust and confidence, either to the market place in general or
to the particular counterparties with whom he traded, he could not be convicted
of violating any such duty.
76
The second case rejecting open-ended fiduciary duties was Dirks v. SEC. 77
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in a civil lawsuit brought by the SEC against a
stock market analyst called Raymond Dirks, reaffirmed that some breach of a
preexisting duty of trust and confidence is necessary to sustain a claim of
illegal insider trading.
78
In the context of the present inquiry, two facts about the Chiarella and
Dirks cases deserve special attention. First, in both cases, the SEC pushed a far
more expansive interpretation of the rules against insider trading than the
Supreme Court was willing to accept. In Chiarella, the SEC pressed the theory
that Rule 10b-5 was breached whenever somebody with an informational
advantage exploited that informational advantage by using it to make trading
profits in the securities markets. The Supreme Court rejected this theory
because they rejected the SEC's assertion that traders owe any sort of
generalized duty to market participants.79
72 See text surrounding notes 74-78 infra.
73 See id.
74 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
75 Id. at 233.
76 Id.
77 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
78 Id.
79 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233; see also Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The
New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9 (1984).
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Second, the argument that private citizens owe no generalized fiduciary
duties to capital market participants does not automatically imply that federal
officials, particularly elected officials, owe no such duties. In particular, elected
officials who serve on committees and, in their official capacities, receive
material nonpublic economic information and information about specific
industries, companies, or economic sectors, would clearly seem to owe a
"generalized" fiduciary duty to the public, including the securities markets. On
the other hand, an argument can be made that insider trading by members of
Congress is not illegal. For example, a former SEC Enforcement Division
official has been quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying
[i]f a congressman learns that his committee is about to do something that would
affect a company, he can go trade on that because he is not obligated to keep that
information confidential .... He is not breaching a duty of confidentiality to
anybody and therefore he would not be liable for insider trading.
80
The idea that people elected to Congress owe duties of trust and
confidence to the public seems right to us. The narrower view attributed to the
SEC official in the above paragraph may accurately reflect current law. But the
theory that members of Congress are barred under current law from engaging in
insider trading is clearly plausible. What we find interesting is that the SEC is
so willing to stretch the contours of the rules against insider trading when
prosecuting private citizens (as we saw in their unsuccessful efforts in both
Dirks and Chiarella), but is unwilling to make an appeal for a far more modest
stretch of the rules in the context of elected public officials.
The idea that the SEC-the administrative agency ostensibly in charge of
protecting the nation's capital markets-would not at least attempt to formulate
a rule, much less an enforcement strategy, to combat insider trading by federal
elected public officials seems particularly strange in light of the clear public
policy problems involved in this sort of trading. In particular, elected officials
have incentives to introduce legislation for personal gain. As Fred McChesney
has pointed out:
[P]oliticians routinely submit legislative bills that would take money from
various persons or groups, and then withdraw them once (constitutionally
protected) payments are made. These bills go by different names. In California
they are called "juice bills," referring to their ability to squeeze those who would
lose from taxation unless they pay up. In Illinois, they are called "fetcher bills,"
for their ability to fetch money from otherwise victimized taxpayers who pay to
avoid the greater financial pain. "Milker" bill is another term used, for obvious
81reasons.
80 Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks To Ban Inside Trading by Lawmakers and Their Aides, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at Al (quoting Thomas Newkirk, a partner with the law firm Jenner & Block and a
former official with the SEC's Enforcement Division).
81 Fred S. McChesney, What's Mine Is Theirs: The Ever-Shimmering Mirage of Lasting Tax
Reform, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.econlib.org/Library/Columns/y2005/
Mcchesneytaxreform.html.
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It stands to reason that if politicians can submit bills for the purpose of
attracting contributions (and other forms of cash), they also can submit bills for
the purpose of making trading profits. In other words, the ability of elected
officials to profit on the basis of material nonpublic information creates
perverse incentives for these officials, and introduces innumerable distortions
and the potential for immeasurable harm in a legal system in which public trust
and confidence is critical.
2. Proposed Legislation: The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge
(STOCK) Act
With the SEC unwilling to take any sort of initiative against insider
trading by senators and other congressional officers, Congress has been left to
police itself. Not surprisingly, this effort has not been a success.
In May 2007, the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK)
82Act was introduced . The bill, if enacted, would make it illegal for
congressional and federal workers to use information obtained in the course of
their official duties to trade stock on the basis of that information. In addition,
the STOCK Act seeks to regulate what are known as "political intelligence"
companies, which collect material nonpublic information from Capitol Hill and
sell it to professional money managers, particularly hedge funds.
The STOCK Act would amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Commodities Exchange Act to direct both the SEC and the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission to prohibit the purchase or sale of either securities
or commodities for future delivery by a person in possession of material
nonpublic information regarding pending or prospective legislative action if the
information was obtained: (1) knowingly from a member or employee of
Congress; (2) by reason of being a member or employee of Congress; or (3)
from other federal employees.
The STOCK Act would also amend the Code of Official Conduct of the
Rules of the House of Representatives to prohibit designated House personnel
from disclosing material nonpublic information relating to any pending or
prospective legislative action involving either securities of a publicly-traded
company or a commodity if such personnel has reason to believe that the
information will be used to buy or sell securities or commodities. In addition,
the STOCK Act would amend the Ethics in Govemment Act of 1978 to require
formal disclosure of certain securities and commodities futures transactions to
either the Clerk of the House of Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate,
and it would change the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to subject political
intelligence activities, contacts, firms, and consultants to its registration,
reporting, and disclosure requirements.
83




84This bill has foundered in committee since it was introduced. It has not
even been scheduled for debate in either house, much less voted on. The most
plausible explanation for the failure of this legislation is that self-interested
congressional officials do not want to put an end to the lucrative trading
opportunities that are made available to them when they receive important
nonpublic information in their official capacities. And with the SEC's being
happily complicit with this behavior, why should Congress upset the apple
cart?
B. Arthur Andersen: Outlier or Scapegoat?
Enron and other corporate financial scandals focused attention on the
accounting industry in general and on Arthur Andersen in particular. Some of
the governmental responses and initiatives to the wave of Enron-style corporate
collapses reflect the view that Andersen, Enron's auditor, was an outlier among
accounting firms. In particular, the government, in its regulatory response to
Enron's collapse, took the view that Enron's accounting firm, Arthur Andersen,
was significantly more corrupt and susceptible to capture than its rival auditing
firms.
A key aspect of the policy response to Enron was the criminal prosecution
of Andersen. Interestingly, one commentator observed, "the Justice
Department's decision to bring criminal charges against Andersen and not
against any other major accounting firm supports the view that Andersen
deserved to be singled out for special treatment."85 This observation, in our
view, reflects a rather naive acceptance of the controversial assumption that the
government is always right. The Justice Department's prosecution of Arthur
Andersen reflects only that the government believed (or asserted that it
believed) that Andersen deserved to be singled out for special treatment. The
government might have been wrong. Or it might have been politically
motivated and influenced to take action in the wake of the public outcry over
the failure of Enron.
The bringing of criminal charges led directly to the demise of Andersen,
86
notwithstanding the fact that Andersen's conviction ultimately was overturned
unanimously by the U.S. Supreme Court. The prosecution of Andersen
eliminated for all time one of the very few firms capable of auditing the largest
84 The bill was referred to the House Agriculture Subcommittee on General Farm
Commodities. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 2341 - I I0th Congress (2007): Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1 10-2341 (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
85 Pornsit Jirapom, Shareholder Rights, Corporate Governance, and Auditor Selection:
Evidence from Arthur Andersen (Feb. 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (emphasis
added), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=926746.
86 Federal regulations forbid convicted felons to audit public companies. On August 31, 2002,
in the wake of its conviction on June 15, 2002, Andersen surrendered its license as a Certified Public
Accounting Firm, ending the firm's ability to do business. Andersen never returned to business, even
though its conviction was overturned in 2005.
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U.S. public corporations. Jonathan Macey and Ted Eisenberg developed a
direct test of this "special" status of Arthur Andersen by examining whether
Andersen's performance was in fact worse than that of other accounting firms.
The metric they applied measured whether Andersen's clients issued and filed
erroneous financial statements that had to be restated more often than the other
large auditing firms.
87
The stakes of accurately describing Andersen's performance in auditing
public companies were high. Only a few accounting firms have the capability
to audit multiple large, public corporations. Removing a major player from
such a thin market has had dramatic implications for the public securities
markets as well as for the accounting industry. Independent of Andersen's
particular performance, the stakes of understanding the pattern of financial
restatements are also high. The Eisenberg-Macey analysis of about 1000 large,
public firms from 1997-2001 yielded no evidence that Andersen's performance
as an auditor was any different from the performance of its peer auditing
firms. 88 Andersen's clients did not restate their financial results at a
significantly different rate than the other major accounting firms during this
period. During the period of study, private plaintiffs and government regulators
began to focus more intensively on accounting irregularities, and the
percentage of public companies restating their financial results increased
dramatically. But, contrary to the hypothesis that Andersen was special, there
was no significant rise in Andersen's share of the increased number of
restatements, and the distribution of restatements among the largest accounting
firms remained roughly the same.
Thus, by the restatement-rate measure, the vilified and now-defunct
Andersen was not objectively different from the other major accounting firms.
Whether these findings mean that Andersen was not as bad as it was perceived
to have been, or whether they mean that the other big accounting firms were
worse than was generally thought, is a matter of interpretation for the reader. In
either case, these results raise serious doubts about the prosecutorial judgment
that brought Arthur Andersen's existence to an end. Financial restatements
trigger significant negative market reactions, and their frequency can be viewed
as a measure of accounting performance. Based on the financial restatement
activity of approximately 1000 large, public firms from 1997 through 2001, and
controlling for client size, region, time, and industry, there is no evidence that
Andersen's performance significantly differed from that of other large
accounting firms.
8 9
These findings, of course, raise the question of why the government, so
attuned to the scientific evidence in the odd-eighth quotes investigation, the
market timing cases, and the options backdating cases discussed above, chose





to ignore precisely the same sort of evidence in the case of the prosecution
against Arthur Andersen. The evidence in this paper strongly suggests the
following explanation: the government brings cases when it is in the officials'
interest to do so, regardless of the social science evidence.
C. The Evidence for Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There a Quacker in the House?
In the summer of 2002 Congress enacted one of the most profound pieces
of economic legislation in history. The definitive study of this legislation has
been done by Roberta Romano, and in this section we largely apply her
analysis and insights to the theory developed here about when policymakers
ignore social science research and when they pay close attention to it.
90
Romano's research demonstrates that Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted against
a background of existing social science research that might have been deployed
to inform the contents of the statute, but was not. Specifically, Romano
"evaluates SOX's substantive governance provisions and the political dynamics
that produced them from the perspective of the substantial body of empirical
accounting and finance literature related to those provisions." 91 As Romano
points out, "the gist" of the extant empirical social science literature in financial
economics made it clear that "the proposed mandates would not be effective,"
and this literature "was available to legislators while they were formulating
SOX."'92 In other words, the new provisions of SOX imposed reforms that the
existing social science literature had found to be ineffective. Moreover,
although Congress passed this legislation in the wake of the Enron scandal,
substantive provisions of SOX did not even have a nexus to the problems
within Enron that led to the firm's collapse.
93
Romano focused on four provisions of SOX that relate to the internal
corporate governance of publicly traded companies subject to the SEC's
jurisdiction.94 These provisions (1) require corporations to have audit
committees that are "independent"; 95 (2) restrict the ability of corporations to
obtain consulting services and other non-audit related services from their
auditors;96 (3) prohibit personal loans to their officers; 97 and (4) require new
"certifications" of the integrity of financial statements by the chief executive
90 Romano, supra note 15.
91 Id. at 1526.
92 Id.
93 Id. ("What is perhaps most striking is how successful policy entrepreneurs were in
opportunistically coupling their corporate governance proposals to Enron's collapse, offering as
ostensible remedies for future 'Enrons' reforms that had minimal or absolutely no relation to the source
of that firm's demise.").
94 Id. at 1529-40.
95 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(2006).
96 Id. at § 10A (2006).
97 Id. at § 78m (2006).
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officers and the chief financial officers of the public companies that issue such
statements.
98
For each of these issues, Romano conducted a thorough review of the
literature, concluding that these provisions of SOX represent public policy
errors inconsistent with the available statistical evidence in finance and
economics. 99 In other words, as Romano observed, the empirical literature
"suggests that a case does not exist for the principal corporate governance
mandates in SOX."
100
1. Independent Audit Committees
Romano found that, in general, independent boards of directors do not
improve the performance of corporations. More pertinently, Romano found
four studies that examine the relationship between the composition of corporate
audit committees and firm performance.10 1 In none of these studies were the
authors able to find "any relation between audit committee independence and
performance, using a variety of performance measures including both
accounting and market measures as well as measures of investment strategies
and productivity of long-term assets."
' 10 2
In addition to examining whether independent audit committees improve
corporate performance, Romano also found a host of studies (fifteen in all) that
examined whether firms with independent audit committees tend to experience
less financial misconduct than firms with audit committees that have
management representatives. 10 3 As Romano observed, "[t]he compelling thrust
of the literature on the composition of audit committees... does not support
the proposition [reflected in SOX's provisions] that requiring audit committees
to consist solely of independent directors will reduce the probability of
financial statement wrongdoing or otherwise improve corporate
performance."1
04
98 Id. at § 7241 (2006).
99 Romano, supra note 15, at 1529-53.
100 Id. at 1543.
101 Id. at 1530 & n.23 (citing April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee
Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 287-301 (1998); Nikos Vafeas & Elena Theodorou, The Relationship
Between Board Structure and Firm Performance in the UK, 30 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 383, 398 (1998);
Charlie Weir et al., Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of
Large UK Public Companies, 29 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 579, 606 (2002); and Julie Cotter & Mark
Silvester, Board and Monitoring Committee Independence, ABACUS, June 2003, at 211, 228-29).
102 Romano, supra note 15, at 1530.
103 Id. at 1530-31 & n.24.
104 Id. at 1533.
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2. The Prohibition Against Non-Audit (Consulting) Services by Auditors
Because the provision of non-audit services to certain public companies
by the accounting firms responsible for auditing those same public companies
was the subject of controversy for several years prior to SOX, there was already
an extensive literature investigating these issues when SOX was being debated.
In particular, numerous research studies attempted to measure whether
companies that received non-audit services in addition to audit services from
their accounting firms were more likely to experience a decline in audit quality
than firms that did not receive non-audit services from the accounting firms
performing their audits. Reviewing twenty-five studies on the provision of non-
audit services by accounting firms, 0 5 Romano found that the empirical
evidence supporting the proposition that there is no connection between audit
quality and the provision of non-audit services is "compelling."
' 10 6
3. The Prohibition Against Loans to Corporate Officers
In looking at a third dimension of SOX, Romano did not find any
empirical research on the question of whether loans to corporate officers harm
corporate performance or compromise companies' financial reporting. This
paucity of research is largely due to this issue not having been particularly
salient prior to the passage of SOX. 10 7 Romano did identify a study that
analyzed whether corporate loans to insiders were used to facilitate the
purchase of stock by the insiders. That study found that the bulk of the insider
loans in the sample studied "were made to assist in stock purchases and stock
option exercises."' 1 8 It is well known that share ownership by insiders is a
highly effective way to align the interests of managers and shareholders. To the
extent that insider loans are used to facilitate share purchases and the exercise
of stock option grants, they increase firm value by improving managers'
incentives to maximize firm value. As Romano noted, "[b]ecause executive
loans in many ways appear to serve their purpose of increasing managerial
stock ownership, thereby aligning managers' and shareholders' interests, the
blanket prohibition of executive loans in SOX is self-evidently a public policy
error."
, 109
4. The Certification of Financial Results
Consistent with the above results, Romano argued that those studies
relevant to SOX's new requirements regarding certification (for example, that
105 See id. at 1606-10, Thl.5.
106 Id. at 1536-37.
107 Id. at 1539.
108 Id. Other loans were used simply to assist insiders in relocating. Id.
109 Id.
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corporate CEOs and CFOs must certify that the financial reports filed by their
companies do not contain material misstatements or omissions and fairly
present the firm's financial conditions and the results of operations) find that
for most firms certification or noncertification was irrelevant because they did
not provide investors and other capital market participants with any new
information.'10 While the evidence here is not conclusive, Romano is clearly
correct to suggest that a superior policy approach would have been to make
certification optional in order to allow companies to use the special certification
procedure required by SOX if they elected to do so. This approach would have
permitted firms that received no benefit from certifications to avoid the
significant compliance costs associated with the certification regime."'
In her research, Romano argues that SOX was enacted as emergency
legislation at a time when the market was plummeting and the media obsessing
over corporate scandals. 12 Legislators reacted to public outrage, ignoring the
increasingly unpopular business community and adopting policy at odds with
scholars' recommendations in an election year. Essentially, the SOX framers
ignored the relevant evidence because the evidence indicated that what they
proposed to do would, in all likelihood, be highly ineffective and the political
climate made it crucial that they take "decisive" action.
III. Concluding Remarks
A. The Political Science of Law and Public Policy
That scholarship can inform public policy is the good news from our
analysis; that it often does not is the bad news. We have argued above that a
critical factor in determining which outcome prevails is the political expediency
that attaches to the events in question. But political expediency itself can be
influenced by the popular opinion of the day, and this in turn is affected by the
dissemination of information about events and market behaviors. Thus, the
linkage between scholarship and public policy may be more circuitous than it is
linear. In this concluding section, we discuss more generally the process by
which law and public policy evolve.
B. Scholarship and Crisis as Catalysts for Policy Change
We have discussed above several examples where scholarship has led to
important-and in some cases dramatic-market change. An interesting feature
110 Id. at 1542. Interestingly, for a subset of companies, specifically bank holding companies
and other "informationally opaque" companies, early certifications provided useful information to the
market.
Ill Id. at 1543.
112 Id. at 1528.
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of each of these examples is that the resultant change in public policy was an
unforeseen offshoot of academic research on interesting and important features
of the financial markets. We think it safe to say that none of these authors could
have predicted the impact their work would have on the markets (or on the
consulting dollars it would generate for their colleagues).
But it is fair to say that academic research can, and should, play an
important role in moving the public policy agenda. While the specific examples
above illustrate this point, there are many other instances in which scholarship
informs public policy. The Global Settlement11 3 separating underwriting and
research in investment banking was informed by a plethora of academic works
showing biases in financial analysts' recommendations with respect to the
stocks their firms underwrote. 14 Yet, it was only in the aftermath of the tech
stock bubble that this research began to have impact. Similarly, there was
abundant academic research highlighting the moral hazard problems connected
with the ill-fated Garn-St. Germain Act, 1 15 which many believe precipitated the
savings and loan (S&L) crisis, but this too was ignored until the entire S&L
industry was in shambles.1 6 The research highlighting almost identical moral
hazard problems in the structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is but another
recent example of this pattern. 117 These instances suggest that it may not be
what you say so much as when you say it that matters for influencing public
policy.
That policy change is typically enacted in the aftermath of crises leads us
to a final observation regarding the role of scholarship in affecting regulation.
Scholarship may play its role by illuminating problem areas, but to actually
113 SEC, Statement Regarding Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts of Interest,
Apr. 28, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm.
114 See, e.g., Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653 (1999).
115 The Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2000)
deregulated the Savings and Loan industry. Significant provisions of the Act: (1) authorized banks and
savings institutions to offer a new account, the "money market" deposit account, which was a
transaction account with no interest rate ceiling designed to permit banks to compete with money market
mutual funds; (2) gave savings and loan associations the authority to make commercial loans; (3) gave
federal regulatory agencies the authority to approve, for the first time, interstate acquisitions of failed
banks and savings institutions; (4) permitted savings associations to increase their consumer lending,
from 20% to 30% of assets, and to expand their dealer lending and floor-plan loan financing; (5) raised
the ceiling on direct investments by savings institutions in nonresidential real estate from 20% to 40% of
assets, and also allowed investment of 10% of assets in education loans for any educational purpose, and
up to 100% of assets in state and municipal bonds; (6) allowed state chartered lenders to offer the same
kinds of alternative mortgages permitted nationally chartered financial institutions; (7) raised the legal
lending limit for national banks from 10% to 15% of capital and surplus; and (8) permitted the use of
adjustable rate mortgages. See also President Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Gain-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Oct. 15, 1982), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/101582b.htm.
116 For a summary of work on these issues see David H. Pyle, The U.S. Savings and Loan
Crisis, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: FINANCE 1105 (R.A.
Jarrow et al. eds., 1995).
117 See Dwight Jaffee, The Interest Rate Risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 24 J. FIN.
SERVICES RES. 5 (2003).
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change regulatory policy, policymakers need to pay attention. But what
determines the regulatory agenda, or to put it more succinctly, when a research
finding is accorded attention or oblivion, is less obvious. Certainly, it is far
easier, and much less risky, for policymakers to react to problems rather than
act to prevent them. And it is this tendency that results in some academic
studies becoming learned footnotes in history rather than precursors for
proactive market change.
If regulators tend to heed studies and promote regulatory initiatives out of
political gain, it follows that they will be more likely to act in the face of
popular attention and outrage. Major financial crises produce headlines, public
concern, and calls for reform; furthermore, these crises promise media attention
and public support to reward regulators who might claim to solve the problem.
The timeless desire to gain political clout and public support might best explain
the government's highly public scapegoating of Arthur Andersen in the wake
of Enron's collapse, as well as Eliot Spitzer's investigation of mutual fund
trading after Ziobrowski's studies made headlines.
When regulators and policymakers provide a role for research to influence
the regulatory agenda, rather than have research findings simply serve as a
convenient backdrop to decisions undertaken in times of crisis, then
policymaking will be improved. We think a necessary first step in this process
is to recognize the important linkages between scholarship and regulation. We
hope our Essay can play a role in effectuating this change.
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